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Abstract
Background: Four social audits in 1998, 2003, 2006 and 2009 identified actions that Nicaragua could take to
reduce corruption and public perception in primary health care and other key services.
Methods: In a 71-cluster sample, weighted according to the 1995 census and stratified by geographic region and
settlement type, we audited the same five public services: health centres and health posts, public primary schools,
municipal government, transit police and the courts. Some 6,000 households answered questions about perception
and personal experience of unofficial and involuntary payments, payments without obtaining receipts or to the
wrong person, and payments “to facilitate” services in municipal offices or courts. Additional questions covered
complaints about corruption and confidence in the country’s anti-corruption struggle. Logistic regression analyses
helped clarify local variations and explanatory variables. Feedback to participants and the services at both national
and local levels followed each social audit.
Results: Users’ experience of corruption in health services, education and municipal government decreased. The
wider population’s perception of corruption in these sectors decreased also, but not as quickly. Progress among
traffic police faltered between 2006 and 2009 and public perception of police corruption ticked upwards in parallel
with drivers’ experience. Users’ experience of corruption in the courts worsened over the study period – with the
possible exception of Managua between 2006 and 2009 – but public perception of judicial corruption, after
peaking in 2003, declined from then on. Confidence in the anti-corruption struggle grew from 50% to 60%
between 2003 and 2009. Never more than 8% of respondents registered complaints about corruption.
Factors associated with public perception of corruption were: personal experience of corruption, quality of the
service itself, and the perception that municipal government takes community opinion into account and keeps
people informed about how it uses public funds.
Conclusions: Lowering citizens’ perception of corruption in public services depends on reducing their experience
of it, on improving service quality and access and – perhaps most importantly – on making citizens feel they are
well-informed participants in the work of government.
Background
We conducted four social audits on corruption in Nicar-
agua over an eleven-year period from 1998 to 2009.
Companion articles explain the social audit concept [1]
and report on other corruption-related social audits
[2,3].
The Republic of Nicaragua is spatially the largest coun-
try in Central America, bordered by El Salvador and
Honduras to the north, Costa Rica to the south, the Paci-
fic Ocean to the west and the Caribbean Sea to the east.
One quarter of its population of 6 million people lives in
the capital region of Managua. The economy is primarily
agricultural with beef and dairy products, coffee, seafood,
beans, groundnuts and sugar as its primary export crops.
Gold exports are another important source of revenue
[4]. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch killed thousands, rendered
20% of the population homeless and caused billions of
dollars worth of damage. Its 2009 gross domestic income
(GDI) per capita according to the World Bank was US
$1,070, the second lowest in the western hemisphere [5].
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Nations Development Programme’sH u m a nD e v e l o p -
ment Index than its near neighbour, Guatemala, with a
per capita GDI two and a half times as large [6].
We conducted four social audits under the auspices of
somewhat different entities but always with governments
of the time. The first audit took place during the presi-
dency of Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002), the second and
third during the presidency of Enrique Bolaños (2002-
2007) and the fourth during t h es e c o n dp r e s i d e n c yo f
Daniel Ortega (2007 - present).
Transparency International (TI) has been a severe critic
of corruption in Nicaragua [7]. Among the increasing
number of countries included in TI’sc o r r u p t i o ni n d e x
during the years from 1998 to 2010, Nicaragua’s ranking
for “perceived corruption” has remained essentially the
same over that period. In 2010 its ranking improved
slightly (127) compared to the previous year when it was
given the same rank as Nigeria (130). TI’sf o c u si so n
grand corruption, emphasising legislative and institutional
weaknesses and large-scale bribery; its rankings are “per-
ceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assess-
ments and opinion surveys” [8].
Three surveys conducted in 2004 and 2006 and 2008 by
Vanderbilt University’s Latin America Public Opinion Pro-
ject (LAPOP), asked respondents if they were asked to pay
bribes during the previous year and how widespread they
considered corruption in the country. The proportion
asked to pay bribes remained very similar over that period,
varying between 16% and 18% [9,10].
We measured both perception and personal experience
of corruption in five public services over an eleven year
period using a different set of indicators. Instead of open
requests for bribes we looked at unofficial and involuntary
payments, payments made without obtaining receipts or
to the wrong person, and payments to “facilitate” a service
in a municipal office or a court.
Our four social audits studied a sample of 6,000 house-
holds in 71 clusters representative of the country’ss e v e n
geographical regions in 1998, 2003, 2006 and 2009. From
the beginning, these surveys sought actions that could be
taken by government authorities to decrease both corrup-
tion itself and public perception of it. We audited the
same five public services in all four cycles: health centres
and health posts, municipal government, public primary
schools, transit police and the courts.
Methods
The sample
Using the 1995 census as the sample frame for the seven
geographical regions (West, Pacific-south, Segovias,
North, Centre, Managua and Caribbean coast), we stra-
tified by type of settlement (regional capital, departmen-
tal centre, municipality centre, rural settlement) propor-
tional to population. The last stage of selection was pur-
posive: a regional committee with knowledge and
experience selected panels of sites they agreed to repre-
sent the spread of physical and socio-economic condi-
tions in each stratum. We used the same geographical
sample in each of four measurement cycles. There was
no sampling within the clusters; we surveyed all house-
holds in each cluster.
The original 70 sites became 71 when we divided a
neighbourhood in Matagalpa into two sites. There was
no change in the settlements covered by each of the
four surveys. For analysis, we weighted each site in pro-
portion to the sample and to the population.
The survey
We designed the survey instruments (household question-
naire and key informant interview guide) in consultation
with technicians from government and civil society.
Questions covered both experience and perception of
corruption in the five services; health centres and health
posts, education, municipal government, transit police
and the courts. (In 2009, at the request of authorities,
we included three new government services in the sur-
vey: the Office of the Comptroller General, the Public
Prosecutor’sO f f i c ea n dt h eProcuraduría General de la
República which represents the state in all business
negotiations. We also added some questions widening
the scope of the inquiry into primary education and the
police force. This article reports only on answers to
questions raised in more than one of the four surveys.)
Six survey teams composed of three interviewers, a
supervisor and a support worker conducted the house-
hold surveys, capturing responses in Bhopal books
[11,12]. We determined the number of households to
survey in each type of settlement by the number that a
team travelling in one vehicle could cover in one day. In
rural communities this resulted in 60 to 70 contiguous
households. In the municipal and departmental centres
the number was 100 to 110 and in Managua it averaged
130.
Training of field workers focused on the interview pro-
cess, recording responses in the Bhopal book and on ethi-
cal issues that might arise from the interview including
confidentiality and respect. As far as possible, the same
interviewers returned to the same settlements in each of
the four surveys. Refresher training before each of the
post-1998 surveys updated the skills of the veterans and
incorporated any new interviewers into the process. Train-
ing went hand in hand with piloting in neighbourhoods
outside those of the sample. Supervisors had to certify that
newcomers were fully trained before field work could
begin.
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Data entry relied on Epi-Info, the public domain data
entry and analysis package. Double data entry and verifi-
cation of discordant records minimised key-stroke
errors. Further cleaning looked for logical inconsisten-
cies and out-of-range responses. Analysis relied on Epi-
Info in the first cycle and subsequently on CIETmap,
open source software that combines epidemiological
analysis with raster and vector mapping [13]. Initial ana-
lysis generated weighted frequencies of the main indica-
tors about service use and perceptions and experience
of corruption.
We reported contrasts as adjusted odds ratio (ORa); 95%
confidence intervals (CI) were those of Cornfield; and inter-
action was assessed using the test of Woolf [14]. We tested
the significance of differences in levels of indicators from
one year to another using the Mantel-Haenszel Chi square
(X
2mh) procedure [15]. We calculated gains as the product
of the risk difference (RD) and the proportion requiring
intervention (PRI). We did not adjust for clustering.
Conditioning variables were: sex, age and educational
level of the person interviewed; geographic region; degree
of urbanization; poverty levels; user/non-user of services
during the time period; participation in any organisations;
perceiving that municipal authorities take community opi-
nions into account; and feeling informed - and by what
medium - about use of municipal funds.
Feedback
Interviewers returned to the same households they had
interviewed to distribute a pamphlet summarising the
aggregate results of each cycle. We presented results at the
national level to the authorities responsible for oversight of
municipal government, the health and education minis-
tries, the national police and the court system. We dis-
cussed results specific to each geographical region at
regional workshops with representatives of each regional
department and each of the services that were the subject
of the audit. We used population-weighted raster maps as
appropriate during these presentations. Figure 1 gives an
example of these maps.
Ethical considerations
Social audits only deal anonymously with occurrence of
corrupt practices. They do not name perpetrators. To
avoid reprisals we do not report data at the cluster level.
The lowest level of disaggregation at which we reported
data from these surveys was by geographic region or
Figure 1 Geographic change from 2006 to 2009 in respondents’ perception of corruption in any of the Nicaraguan public services investigated.
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Nicaragua had no mechanism for review of this kind of
research. Therefore, the ethics committee of the Centro de
Investigación de Enfermedades Tropicales (CIET) of the
Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero in Mexico gave ethical
clearance for these surveys.
Results
Health centres and health posts
The proportion who received attention at public health
centres and posts in the six months before the survey
fluctuated from 59% in 1998 to 63% in 2003 and down
to 54% in 2006; but then it increased substantially in
2009 to 75%.
The proportion who reported being asked to make a
financial contribution for services received at a health
centre or health post declined steadily over the eleven-
year period. In 2009 it was only 2%.
It took some time, however, for perception of corrup-
tion in the health services to decline. It increased
between 1998 and 2003 while experience of corruption
was declining quite steeply. Only after that did trend in
perceptions begin to match that of users’ experience
more consistently (Figure 2).
In 1998, 2003 and 2006 we asked respondents if anyone
in these health services had asked them for a contribution
and, if the answer was affirmative, whether they were
given a receipt for the contribution. In light of a new pol-
icy of totally free health services established in 2007, the
2009 survey simply asked the first of these questions.
In 2006, respondents asked to make a financial contri-
bution to a health centre or health post were 60% more
likely to perceive corruption in these services (ORa 1.6,
95% CI: 1.2-2.0). In 2009 perception of corruption in
health centres and health posts was associated with the
perception that communityo p i n i o n sw e r en o tt a k e n
into account by municipal governments (ORa 1.7, 95%
CI: 1.4-2.0).
Satisfaction with the service received at health centres
and health posts was also associated with perception of
corruption in those services (2006 ORa 1.8, 95% CI 1.4-
2.4; 2009 ORa 2.9, 95% CI 2.6-3.3).
Public primary schools
The proportion of households with at least one child
between the ages of 7 and 12 matriculated in a public
primary school remained around 70-80% over the ele-
ven-year period.
We asked about perception of corruption in the
schools in all four cycles. In 1998, 2003 and 2006 we
asked participants if they made any monetary contribu-
tion to the school in the past year and if so whether
they contributed out of their own choice or if they were
obliged to do so. In light of a 2007 presidential decree
that all primary and secondary education was free, our
2009 questionnaire simply asked whether respondents
paid anything and we considered any payment made to
have been involuntary.
The population’s perception of corruption in public
primary schools stayed constant between 1998 and
2003, decreased somewhat from 2003 to 2006 and
dropped more steeply after that. Experience of corrup-
tion, in the form of involuntary contributions to school
expenses, decreased steadily from the first survey cycle
in 1998 (Figure 3).
Figure 2 Perception of corruption in health centres compared with
users’ having paid for the service, 1998-2009
Figure 3 Perception of corruption in public primary education
compared with parents’ involuntary contributions to school
expenses, 1998-2009
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ciated with being asked for an involuntary monetary con-
tribution (2003: ORa 1.8, 95% CI 1.5-2.1;2006: ORa 1.4,
95% CI 1.0-1.9; 2009: ORa 2.7, 95% CI 2.2-3.5).
Around 60% of respondents expressed satisfaction with
quality of education over the eleven-year period of our
surveys. Perception of teaching quality and perception of
corruption were closely associated. In 2006, a respondent
who considered that the teaching quality was “bad” was 14
times as likely to consider the educational system corrupt
compared with one who thought the teaching was good
(ORa 14.1, 95% CI 4.4-45.4).
Municipal government
Close to 35% of responding households in all four social
audits conducted some type of business with municipal
government during the 6 month before the survey.
Public perception of corruption in municipal govern-
ment increased between 1998 and 2003 but diminished
consistently from then on (Figure 4). Perception of corrup-
tion in municipal government was highest among resi-
dents of the Managua region.
We asked respondents whether they paid anything to
facilitate whatever business they had with the municipalities
and, if so, whether they received a receipt for it. The pro-
portion who paid for facilitating the process increased from
19% to 33% from 1998 to 2003 and after that remained at
roughly this one-third level. On the other hand, the propor-
tion that did not receive receipts for their payments
decreased, only slightly from 1998 to 2003 but then more
markedly afterwards (Figure 4). In 2009 a user who did not
receive a receipt for a payment was 80% more likely to
consider municipal government corrupt compared with
one who did receive a receipt (ORa 1.8, 95% CI 1.1-3.2).
The proportion of respondents who felt that municipal
governments took community opinions into account
doubled from 18% to 37% between 2003 and 2006 and
rose slightly higher in 2009. In 2003, 2006 and 2009, this
perception was associated with not perceiving corruption
in any of the services under consideration as well as by
overall confidence in the government’s anti-corruption
struggle (Table 1).
Regarding municipal government alone, the feeling in
2009 that municipal governments took one’so p i n i o n s
into account was strongly associated with not considering
municipal government corrupt (ORa 3.0, 95% CI 2.7-3.4).
Perceiving that municipal government took into account
community opinions was, in turn, associated with per-
ception of being informed about use of municipal funds.
A respondent who felt informed on the use of funds was
five times as likely to feel that his/her opinions were
taken into account compared with one not informed
(ORa 5.4, 95% CI; 531/718 informed vs. 1848/5332 unin-
formed respondents who feel their opinions taken into
account). If this size of difference could be reproduced in
a large randomised controlled trial, this would imply that
if all citizens were to feel informed about the use of pub-
lic funds by municipalities, the theoretical gain would be
a third more of them who perceive that local government
was taking their opinions into account (RD 0.393, PRI
0.8813, Gain 0.346).
At the same time, the proportion of households report-
ing that they felt informed about how municipal govern-
ments were using public funds had declined from 18% to
16% to 12% between 2003 and 2009. Figure 5 juxtaposes
the trend exhibited by these two related indicators from
2003 to 2009.
Police
Among households where someone had a driver’s licence,
the proportion with someone stopped and fined for a traf-
fic infringement during the previous six months was 24%,
16%, 19% and 25% respectively in 1998, 2003, 2006 and
2009. The proportion reporting they made direct pay-
ments to transit police officials declined from 1998 to
2006 but then rose between 2006 and 2009. The percep-
tion of corruption among all respondents increased from
1998 to 2003 while drivers’ experience of it was declining,
but thereafter the perception tracked drivers’ experiences
more closely (Figure 6).
Factors associated with perception of corruption in the
police force included having had to make direct pay-
ments to police officers (2003 ORa: 1.9, 95% CI 1.0-3.2;
2009 ORa 1.9, 95% CI 1.3-3.0), having learned of cor-
rupt behaviour by high-level public officials in the pre-
vious month (2006 ORa 2.5, 95% CI 2.2-2.9) and
Figure 4 Perception of corruption in municipal government
compared with users’ getting receipts for payments made, 1998-2009
Arosteguí et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11(Suppl 2):S3
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/S2/S3
Page 5 of 10absence of rural judicial facilitators (ORa 1.3, 95% CI
1.1-1.7).
Courts
The proportion of households where a member had busi-
ness with the court system during the two years before
the survey stayed between 14% and 18% over the eleven
year period. We asked respondents whether they had to
pay to facilitate the court procedure. Among those who
said yes in 2009, three-quarters paid through lawyers and
20% directly to a court official.
Perception among all respondents of corruption in the
courts increased from 1998 to 2003 but declined there-
after despite a modest but steady overall increase in cases
where users of the courts had to make payments to facili-
tate their procedures (Figure 7).
In Managua between 2006 and 2009 there was an 8%
decrease in the proportion of users who had to pay to
facilitate a procedure, but because of the small numbers
involved we cannot exclude the possibility that this was a
chance effect. Managua, where the perception of corrup-
tion in the judiciary had previously been higher than
anywhere else in the country, also experienced the stee-
pest decline in that perception from 2006 to 2009 (2006:
796/1113; 2009: 699/1113; Χ
2mh 19.2).
There was an association between users who paid and
the broader perception of corruption. In 2006 and 2009
a respondent who paid to facilitate a procedure was
roughly twice as likely to perceive corruption in the
court system as one who had not paid (2006 ORa 1.8,
95% CI 1.2-2.8; 2009 ORa 2.0, 95% CI 1.4-2.7).
Other factors that influenced perception of corruption
in the courts in 2006 were: having heard about corruption
among high-level public officials during the preceding
month (ORa 2.8, 95% CI 2.3-3.4) and absence of judicial
facilitators (ORa 1.3, 95% CI 1.0-1-6).
Confidence in the anti-corruption struggle
Beginning in 2003, we asked respondents if they had con-
fidence in the anti-corruption struggle. Confidence in the
struggle increased steadily, if not dramatically, from 5 to
6 out of 10 between 2003 and 2009. Respondents older
than 20 years of age and better educated respondents
were less likely to express confidence in the struggle
(X
2mh 8.9 and 15.9 respectively).
Table 1 Perception that municipal governments take community opinion into account: associations with perceptions
that services were not corrupt and with confidence in the anti-corruption struggle (all respondents 2003, 2006, 2009)
2003 2006 2009
ORa 95%CI ORa 95%CI ORa 95%CI
Perception of no corruption in public services* 2.4 1.9-3.1 2.6 2.2-3.1 1.8 1.5-2.2
Confidence in the anti-corruption struggle 1.7 1.5-2.0 1.6 1.2-2.1 1.8** 1.6-2.0
* Respondents who did not perceive corruption in any of the services under investigation by this social audit.
** The association was stronger (OR 2.7) among those who felt informed about how municipal funds were being used.
Figure 5 Contrasting trends in perceptions that community
opinions were taken into account and feeling informed about use
of municipal funds, 2003-2009.
Figure 6 Perception of corruption in police force compared with
drivers having paid fines to police officers directly for traffic
violations, 1998-2009
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corruption struggle in 2009 included:
￿ having been affected by an act of corruption in some
government institution (ORa 2.2, 95% CI 1.8-2.7)
￿ having made an unauthorised payment to any of the
public services under consideration in this study (ORa
1.3, 95% CI 1.1-1.5)
￿ perceiving that educational materials in the primary
schools (ORa 1.5, 95% CI 1.3-1.7) or medicines in health
centres and health posts (ORa 1.6, 95% CI 1.4-1.8) were
not handled “honourably”.
Complaints about corruption
We asked respondents whether they had ever registered a
complaint about any act of corruption and, if not, why
not. Affirmative answers were 5% in 1998, 8% in 2003, 7%
in 2006 and 5% in 2009. Among those who did register a
complaint in 2009 only 36% expressed satisfaction with
the outcome. Reasons given for not registering a com-
plaint included: lack of a reason to do so, indifference, dis-
trust of the system, fear of reprisal, ignorance of the
proper procedure, logistic difficulties and lack of proof.
Discussion
Study limitations
The sample was highly stratified but last stage sample
selection was purposive, based on a regional committee
consensus. A sampling bias cannot be ruled out although
this would be consistent in each of the four measurement
years and should not have affected the time-trends or
associations reported here.
We made no adjustments for a possible clustering
effect during analysis.
Overall progress in the struggle against corruption
The study shows a fairly steady decrease in users’ experi-
ence of corruption in health services, municipal govern-
ment and education. The wider population’s perception of
corruption in these sectors decreased as well, but not as
quickly as did experience itself. One possible explanation
of this phenomenon is that, in addition to their own
experience, people may need repeated confirmation from
others that the practice of corruption has diminished
before their opinions about corruption are likely to
change. Another is the effect of local political discourse
and communication media on public opinion. Progress
b e i n gm a d eb yt h et r a f f i cp o l i c er e v e r s e db e t w e e n2 0 0 6
and 2009 and perception of corruption among the police
ticked upwards in parallel to drivers’ experience. Experi-
ence of corruption in the courts got worse over the ele-
ven-year period of this study, with the possible exception
of Managua between 2006 and 2009. Respondents’ percep-
tion of judicial corruption, after peaking in 2003, declined
from then on. Confidence in the country’s anti-corruption
struggle grew from 50% to 60% between 2003 and 2009.
The proportion of respondents who registered complaints
about corruption never rose higher than 8% over the
entire period.
Health centres and health posts
Health care in Nicaragua was decentralised in the 1990s
with the encouragement and support of the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank. Decisions
about fees charged were made at facility level [16], with
sliding scales for user contributions according to the cli-
ent’s socio-economic status [17]. The complexities of such
a system may help to explain why perception of corruption
increased between 1998 and 2003 while the proportion
asked for a financial contribution without issuance of a
receipt decreased significantly over the same period. This
decline continued between 2003 and 2006 but the latter
period also saw a decline in the proportion of respondents
actually using the health centres and health posts.
The last three years covered by our survey saw a marked
increase in use of services and the near disappearance of
user charges. These years coincide with the new health
policy explicitly to increase access to primary health care
services, conceived as a basic right of all citizens [18]. The
2% involuntary payment figure reported for 2009 is the
proportion of respondents who made any payment at all.
Education
Under the same influence as affected primary health ser-
vices, Nicaragua decentralised its educational system dur-
ing the decade of the 1990s. The new system gave a
certain degree of control to local school councils with
parental participation, but it also gave these councils
responsibility for raising substantial portions of the
Figure 7 Perception of corruption in the court system compared
with users having paid to facilitate a procedure, 1998-2009.
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the decentralisation declared that all Nicaraguans should
have access to free primary education but at the same
time, called the schools “community participation
schools”, thus legitimising some voluntary monetary con-
tributions from parents [19]. For this reason our 1998,
2003 and 2006 surveys distinguished between voluntary
and involuntary contributions; we considered only the
involuntary ones as indicators of corruption. After the
declaration that basic education was totally free in 2007,
our 2009 survey considered any payment to be involun-
tary. In 2009 involuntary contributions were still strongly
associated with people’s perception of corruption in the
primary education system.
Municipal government
Progress in both perception and experience of corruption
in municipal government occurred against a background
of significant legal and fiscal changes during the period of
this study. Municipalities were given some direct responsi-
bilities for their own management for the first time as a
result of the 1995 Law of Municipal Autonomy. The first
municipal elections occurred in 1996 but it was only
beginning in 2003 that central government allocate any
substantial amounts of their revenue to enable municipali-
ties to fulfil their mandates [20]. Public perception that
municipal governments were taking community opinions
into account increased between 2003 and 2006. This coin-
cided with an increase in experience of obtaining receipts
for payments and with a decrease in perception of corrup-
tion in municipal government.
The association between the perception that municipal
governments take community opinions into account and
perception of municipal corruption is one of the key
actionable findings of these surveys. Table 1 suggests that
public perception of being listened to by municipal offi-
cials might help to decrease the perception of corruption
not only in municipal government but also in other gov-
ernment services. Furthermore, policies of informing peo-
ple about how municipalities use public funds can
influence perception of being taken into account and, in
turn, the overall perception of corruption not just in
municipal government but in other public services as well.
Traffic police
The general perception of corruption in the police force,
which was on the decline between 2003 and 2006, levelled
off from 2006-2009 while an increasing proportion of dri-
vers made direct payments to the traffic police.
Drivers’ e x p e r i e n c e sw i t ht h et r a f f i cp o l i c ei so n l yo n e
point of encounter between the public and the police
force. Starting in 2009 we introduced three new ques-
tions on the police: households that had any dealing with
t h ep o l i c ef o r c ei nt h ep r e v i o u sy e a ra n dt h en a t u r eo f
that encounter, opinions on the work of the police, and
payments for facilitating any service requested of the
police. But these are not discussed here because there is
as yet no point of comparison.
The courts
Despite a steady, if modest, rise in the proportion of users
who paid something to facilitate a court procedure (and
the association between having made a payment to facili-
tate and the perception of corruption), the overall percep-
tion of corruption in the judiciary, after rising from 1998
to 2003, decreased markedly between 2003 and 2006 and
c o n t i n u e dt od os oa tal e s s e rr a t ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e e
years.
A partial explanation for this paradox could be that a
very popular programme of “rural justice facilitators”,p r o -
moted by the Organization of American States [21]-
started in 1998 with the express purpose of improving
access to justice for all and speeding up the judicial system
by reducing the backlog of cases. Since the programme
expanded to all parts of the country only gradually, the
downward shift in perception of judicial corruption from
2003 roughly coincided with the period of its roll-out
[22,23]. In 2006 communities that did not have judicial
facilitators were more likely to perceive corruption in the
judiciary.
In the specific case of Managua, the decrease in unof-
ficial payments and perception of corruption in the
courts registered between 2006 and 2009 may be related
to the introduction in June 2007, with support from the
Inter-American Development Bank, of an new model
for management of judicial procedures in the Managua
courts [24].
Confidence in the anti-corruption struggle
This indicator is not tied to any particular government
service discussed in the questionnaire. It refers in principle
to every aspect of the country’s effort to combat corrup-
tion. The way people responded to the question was asso-
ciated with both recent awareness of corrupt behaviour on
the part of high-level public officials and individual experi-
ence of corruption in one or other of the services under
consideration. The increase of confidence in the anti-cor-
ruption struggle from 2003 to 2009 manifested itself in all
settlement types and in all geographic regions.
A different impression is given by the LAPOP surveys
that depict a perception that corruption was becoming
more widespread in Nicaragua from 2004 to 2008. The
LAPOP surveys asked: “Keeping in mind your personal
experience or experiences you have heard about, is cor-
ruption among public officials: (1) Very widespread (2)
Somewhat widespread (3) Not very widespread (4) Not at
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who considered corruption very widespread were 49.1% in
2004, 66.1% in 2006 and 74.3% in 2008.
We did not ask about the extent of corruption among
public officials. We asked whether respondents had con-
fidence in the country’s anti-corruption efforts. The two
questions are not the same but our results do tend to
give a more positive picture of corruption in Nicaragua
than those of LAPOP, perhaps because they were asked
in the context of a search for actionable measures at
national and local levels to carry the struggle against
corruption even further.
Complaints
We were unable to detect any progress over the eleven-
year period in people’s taking the initiative to lodge
complaints about corruption. Government could do a
great deal more to encourage and make it easier for citi-
zens to register complaints. Specifically, it could estab-
lish complaint mechanisms and inform citizens about
how to use them anonymously and securely. For this to
be effective, government must also act upon complaints
once they have been registered and verified and it must
inform the complainant of the result. Complaints
unheeded (or worse) feed cynicism and indifference.
Social Audits and the struggle against corruption
The CIET social audits have been only one of several
instruments in the Nicaraguan struggle against corrup-
tion. At certain moments, however, the audits have
played a perceptible role in that struggle:
✯ With input from the 1998 baseline social audit, the
then National Integrity Committee convened a National
Integrity Forum from which emerged a National Integ-
rity Plan, approved in May 1999. The Plan resulted in a
series of laws including the State Contracts Law which
established a system for tendering government contracts
for public bidding [25], and the law governing the orga-
nization, competence and procedures of Nicaragua’s
executive branch [26].
✯ T h ed a t af r o mt h e2 0 0 6s u r v e yc o n s t i t u t e do n eo f
the lobbying tools used by advocates for what became
the Access to Public Information law of 2007 [27].
✯ This feedback process continued in 2009 with pre-
sentations of the evidence to the relevant institutions
and training centres such as the Police Academy. This
evidence fed into measures such as the Code of Ethics
for Public Servants, proclaimed by Executive Decree 35-
2009 [28].
Particular pieces of evidence from the social audits
appear to have been influential at key moments:
✯ Evidence of how the public perceived the “contribu-
tions” they were asked to make for health and education
services as “involuntary payments” probably gave some
impetus to the move toward eliminating all fees for pri-
mary education and basic health services.
✯ Feedback to authorities from the 2003 survey
onward emphasised the differences among regions
where progress had occurred compared to others where
there was no progress. Changes in perception of corrup-
tion at the local level such as those depicted in Figure 1
appear to reflect the effects of such regional feedback.
In addition:
✯ CIET’s report on the 2009 social audit was made
available to the Nicaraguan public on the website of the
Procuraduría General de la República which represents
the state in all business negotiations [29].
✯ At the time we were completing the final draft of
this article negotiations were under way for a fifth
round of social audit on corruption.
Conclusions
Governments need to deal with both the experience and
perception of corruption. Reducing citizens’ experience of
corruption is the more essential task and there are practi-
cal tools for doing so, such as clear and accessible infor-
mation about use of public funds and prices for services,
extending receipts for all payments, and reducing and clar-
ifying the role of “facilitators” in public transactions. Low-
ering citizens’ perception of corruption in public services
depends most of all on reducing their experience of it, but
also on improving the quality of services and access to
services.
The degree to which citizens feel that they are partici-
pants in the work of government also influences their per-
ception of corruption. Clear and adequate information
about how government uses public funds enhances that
sense of participation. A lack of transparency on how
authorities use the funds entrusted to them can under-
mine efforts to build up the public’s sense that their gov-
ernment takes community opinions into account. Thus
the decline from 2003 to 2009 in respondents’ sense of
being informed about the use of municipal funds is a
threat to Nicaraguan citizens’ sense of participation in
local government.
Central government’s capacity to take the needed
remedial measures is very limited. Reforms need to be
implemented at regional, district, municipal and even
neighbourhood levels and the results monitored periodi-
cally. Repeated social audits of the kind described here
are a useful tool for use by governments who are serious
about dealing with corruption in their midst.
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